Corporate social responsibility and agency cost: 

Evidence from the UK retail industry by Hasan, Fakhrul
 





Dr    Fakhrul Hasan 
 
Liverpool Hope Business School  
 








This paper aims to evaluate corporate social responsibility (CSR) impacts on the UK listed 
retailers' agency costs in 2016-2020 and is broken down into three main objectives – (1) 
describe the UK listed retailers' CSR performance level, (2) test impacts of CSR on agency 
costs of these firms, and (3) test the moderating role of industry for the CSR-agency costs 
relationship. By the application of the regressions with fixed effects and robust standard error 
type, this study has revealed that in this period, the UK listed retailers' CSR performance is at 
the moderate level on average. However, there is a large dispersion in CSR performance 
among retailers. CSR of the UK listed retailers significantly reduced their asset turnover 
(RTA), but it insignificantly affected selling and general administrative expenses (SGAE) ratio. 
This study finds no moderating effects of firm size for UK-listed retailers' CSR - agency costs 
relationship. Finally, this study offers several implications associated with CSR investment and 
corporate governance mechanisms to shareholders and management of the UK-listed retailers 
and academicians. 
 





Since its introduction in the 1950s, the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
has evolved over the decades (Agudelo et al., 2019). However, the consensus on CSR's 
meaning and motives has not been attained (Brammer et al., 2006; Limones, 2020; Miller et 
al., 2020). While the instrument theories of CSR suggests that CSR is implemented since it 
enables firms to generate profits and create shareholder's wealth (Garriga & Melé, 2004), the 
integrative theories of CSR argue that firms engage in CSR to satisfy the demands of 
stakeholders, contributing to the improvement of a company's performance (Nikolova & Arsić, 
2017). Differently, the policy theories of CSR care about the political and social power received 
by firms when they implement CSR (Frynas & Stephens, 2015). In contrast, the ethical theories 
emphasise the ethical aspects of CSR activities (Schwartz, 2011). Therefore, the impacts of 
CSR on a company's performance are increasingly attended by scholars and practitioners as 
findings from such studies can offer helpful implications to literature and practice. However, 
such impacts are mixed in empirical studies, making this topic a puzzle (Yoon & Chung, 2018). 
Under the perspective of the agency theory, agency conflicts are inevitable when 
ownership and management are separated, leading to agency costs incurred by shareholders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, one of the shareholders' critical concerns is to minimise 
agency costs and thus align interests between owners and managers, which is a critical 
condition for improving firms' performance. In the literature, agency costs are found to be 
mitigated by several factors, including effective corporate governance (Imelda & Patricia, 
2019; Hussain et al., 2019) and the utilisation of external debts (Imelda & Patricia, 2019; 
Pandey & Sahu, 2019). However, the impacts of CSR, an increasingly attended practice of 
firms, on agency costs have not been properly investigated. 
In the UK, the 2018 Corporate Governance Code (the Code), the latest version of the 
Corporate Governance Code of the country, suggests that UK firms should engage in CSR 
activities since the sustainability of businesses is essential to the long-term development of 
firms as well as the whole economy. This Code also emphasises the relationship between firms 
and a spectrum of stakeholders (FRC, 2018). In other words, CSR is a good practice that is 
encouraged to be implemented by UK-listed firms. Since the Code was originally developed 
to address the agency dilemma, the promotion of CSR practices in the Code raises several 
questions such as whether CSR implementation supports the mitigation of agency costs; 
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whether CSR that fosters the relationship between firms and stakeholders can involve other 
stakeholders as monitoring mechanisms for firms' performance. Considering the scarcity of 
answers to these questions, this study is initiated to evaluate whether CSR significantly affects 
the UK listed retailers' agency costs from 2016 to 2020 to contribute to addressing the 
determined literature gap. 
This study focuses on the UK-listed retailers as its samples because the retailing industry 
plays a critical role in the UK service sector. This industry offers its products and services to 
end-user customers. Therefore, this industry can be used as an indicator of the strength of 
customer's spending and the performance of the whole economy (ONS, 2020). 
           This study aims to investigate the impacts of CSR on the UK listed retailers' agency 
costs in the period of 2016-2020. This aim is specified in three main objectives. (1) To depict 
the current CSR performance level of the listed retailers in the UK. (2) To evaluate whether 
CSR significantly influences the UK listed retailers’ agency costs. (3) To test whether firms' 
size moderates the relationship between CSR and agency costs. 
 
Following this section. The section we focus on reviewing the literature on theoretical and 
empirical aspects of CSR and the impacts of CSR on firms' performance and agency costs. The 
third section clarifies the research strategy and design and details of techniques used to select 
samples, collect, and analyse the secondary quantitative data. The fourth section presents 
empirical outcomes derived from the descriptive, correlation, and regression analyses and 
discusses findings. The last section summarises the study, its strengths, and weaknesses and 
offers implications associated with CSR performance and mechanisms to mitigate agency costs 
to the UK listed retailers' shareholders, management, and academicians. 
 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
2.1. CSR theories 
2.1.1. Instrument theories 
Emerged from the concept of social responsibility of businesspeople, the concept of CSR 
has evolved over the decades (Frynas & Yamahaki, 2019; Hasan, 2020). However, the 
consensus on its meaning has not been reached (Visser et al., 2010). Carroll (2008) argues that 
the CSR concept is a multifaceted concept that comprises legal liabilities, socially responsible 
behaviours, charitable contributions and the social consciousness of firms. From the more 
comprehensive approach, Garriga & Melé (2004) state that CSR has been viewed by four 
groups of theories – instrument, political, integrative, and ethical. Thus, this concept is defined 
differently from different perspectives. 
From the perspective of the instrument theories, CSR is merely a vehicle for firms to 
achieve their profit goals and to create shareholder’s wealth since the sole social responsibility 
of a business is to generate profit for shareholders within the legal framework and ethical 
standards required by a society (Garriga & Melé, 2004). Therefore, firms should not overinvest 
in CSR since such investment is harmful because of significant costs that emerge from this 
overinvestment (Kang et al., 2010; Crisóstomo et al., 2011). Hence, the investment in CSR is 
minimal to meet the legal and ethical requirements, allowing firms to operate smoothly 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). 
Instrument theories are classified into three groups. The first one is closest to the 
shareholder theory that considers that CSR aims to maximise firms’ short-term profit measured 
by market value per share. 
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The second one focuses on the role of CSR in reallocating firms’ resources to enable firms 
to achieve their long-term sustainable development (Husted & Allen, 2000; Porter & Kramer, 
2002). As a result, firms’ competitiveness can be enhanced. Under this group’s angle, firms 
have the best knowledge of social problems associated with their business. Therefore, the 
investment in CSR enables firms to address these social problems, leading to their long-term 
sustainable performance. For example, an oil and gas company have the best knowledge of 
environmental footprints created by its business (Hasan, 2020). Consequently, its investment 
in environmental initiatives to address these problems is more effective than others, which do 
not fully understand environmental issues created by the oil and gas industry. On the other 
hand, the investment in social initiatives that aims to ensure the wellbeing of employees enables 
firms to enhance their relationships with the people. As a result, firms' competitiveness 
developed based on their people's resources can be enhanced. According to Prahalad (2002), 
the investment in CSR can create a blue ocean for firms. The economic pyramid shows that 
most customers come from the low-income segment. Therefore, when firms produce green and 
recycled products or services, they can meet the demands of many customers in the economic 
pyramid (Masoud, 2017). 
The third group of the instrument theories argues that CSR investment enables firms to 
conduct cause-related marketing strategies that mean the mutually beneficial 
collaboration between firms and non-profit organisations aims to foster sales and encouraging 
social causes (Smith & Higgins, 2000; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). 
 
 
2.1.1.2. Integrative theories 
The integrative theories differently are underpinned by the stakeholder theory that 
contends that firms do not only have shareholders, but they have other stakeholders that 
contribute significant resources to firms (i.e., human resources, natural resources, materials, 
machines, and equipment.) (Freeman et al., 2010). Therefore, firms need to discharge their 
accountability to resource holders through CSR activities reporting when using such resources. 
CSR, hence, needs to be integrated with firms' business strategies. The implementation of CSR, 
thus, is critical to meet the demands of different stakeholders and thereby improves the 
relationship between firms and stakeholders. The integrative theories, hence, promote the 
implementation of CSR to satisfy the demands of firms' stakeholders that enable firms to 




2.2. CSR disclosure theories 
There are differences between CSR implementation and CSR disclosure. CSR 
implementation refers to CSR activities implemented by firms (Agudelo et al., 2019). These 
activities may be justified by different theories such as the instrument, political, integrative, 
and ethical theories (Garriga & Melé, 2004). Differentially, CSR disclosure refers to the 
communication of firms' CSR activities to the public (Cho et al., 2015). This communication 
can be explained by several other theories such as the institutional (Campbell, 2007), the 
legitimacy (Nielsen & Thomsen, 2018), the stakeholder (Freeman, 2010), and the reputational 
risk theories (Unerman, 2008). 
The institutional theory advocates that firms disclose their CSR to deal with institutional 
pressure (i.e., regulations on CSR, competitors' CSR performance and industry's CSR 
performance.) (Campbell, 2007). In other words, when firms face such pressure, they need to 
communicate their CSR activities to the public to either comply with regulations or compete 
against competitors in terms of CSR performance (Brammer et al., 2012). 
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The legitimacy theory argues that firms disclose CSR to legitimate themselves (i.e., BP 
disclosed CSR to legitimate the company from oil spill scandal) (Deegan, 2002). Thus, CSR 
disclosure may be a greenwashing activity (Nielsen & Thomsen, 2018). 
The stakeholder theory contends that CSR disclosure is rooted in demands for discharging 
accountability of firms to their stakeholders (Freeman, 2010). In other words, stakeholders 
offer their resources to firms, so they need firms to discharge firms' accountability to them. For 
example, suppliers offer raw materials and equipment. Thus, they demand firms disclose how 
they treat suppliers in the short-term and long-term. Employees contribute human resources to 
firms, so they demand firms disclose their policies towards employees' wellbeing and safety 
(Nikolova & Arsić, 2017). 
The reputational risk theory considers the benefits of CSR disclosure as the motives of 
these activities. By engaging in CSR disclosure, firms can detect reputational risk and prevent 
such risk (i.e., modern slavery, environmental footprints) (Pineiro-Chousa et al., 2017). In other 
words, CSR disclosure is a process in which firms review their CSR performance and detect 
problems before communicating CSR activities to the public. As a result, firms can prevent 
reputational risk (Unerman, 2008). 
 
2.3. Agency theory 
This study investigates the impacts of CSR on agency costs of the UK-listed retailers. 
Thus, agency theory is a critical theory that clarifies how agency costs emerge and are 
controlled. 
The agency theory contends that the relationship between owners and managers is also 
called the principal-agent relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this contractual 
relationship, each party is driven by its economic benefits according to the model of man for 
agency theory, so managers or agents tend to behave opportunistically to maximise their 
interests, leading to the agency dilemma – the conflicts of interests between principals and 
agents (Shapiro, 2005). 
In the principal-agent relationship, agents are possible to behave opportunistically because 
they are involved in the daily operations of firms on behalf of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Thus, they possess information advantages over principals. The information asymmetry 
enables agents to either consume more resources than needed or to engage with risky projects 
in exchange for their benefits without any responsibility for loss of shareholders (moral hazard) 
(Ballwieser et al., 2012). Because of information asymmetry, principals may also incur adverse 
selection that means the selection of unqualified managers. Consequently, these managers 
underperform, leading to the agency costs incurred by principals (Jensen, 1986). 
Different approaches can mitigate agency costs in the corporate governance literature 
(Saltaji, 2013). The systematic approach to address agency costs is to develop effective internal 
corporate governance mechanisms that enable firms to be directed and controlled as expected 
by principals (Becht et al., 2003). According to Farrar (2008), the core component of the 
internal corporate governance mechanisms is the board of directors that is responsible for firms' 
sustainable and long-term development. The board of directors has several roles – (1) to 
supervise the management to make strategic decisions and (2) to monitor the management's 
behaviours (FRC, 2018). Thus, when the board is effectively presented at the diversity of the 
board members' background, skills, expertise, knowledge of firms, the high level of 
independent directors, the board can perform well to lead firms to achieve their goals and to 
mitigate agency conflicts. Besides the board of directors, other internal corporate governance 
mechanisms may also be effective in reducing agency conflicts such as managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership, the role of the audit committee (Becht et al., 2003). For external 
corporate governance mechanisms, debt financing is considered an effective external 
monitoring system that firms can utilise the mitigate agency conflicts (Jensen, 1986). When 
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firms borrow money from creditors/ lenders, they need to follow debt covenants that are 
thresholds required for firms (i.e. required financial ratios) to ensure that they perform well to 
pay debts. Firms do not want to violate covenants since they have to incur significant fines and 
punishment (Bradley & Roberts, 2015). Therefore, under debt financing, the management tends 
to perform well as expected to prevent firms from violating covenants (Demerjian, 2017). 
 
2.4. CSR impacts on firm’s performance in the UK 
In the UK literature, there are substantial research studies examining the impacts of CSR 
on firms' performance. However, empirical evidence presents a divergence with three main 
trends. 
Firstly, CSR has been found to improve the UK firms' performance (Keffas & Olulu-
Briggs, 2011; Adeneye & Ahmed, 2015; Limones, 2020), meaning that the investment in CSR 
benefited firms as stated by the integrative theories. For example, Keffas & Olulu-Briggs, 2011 
found a positive relationship between CSR measured by the FTSE4Good index and the 
performance of the UK banks. CSR banks presented better asset quality, higher capital 
adequacy, and higher efficiency in managing their portfolios. Adeneye & Ahmed (2015) 
contended that CSR measured by CSR index positively linked with the market to book ratio 
and return on capital employed of the UK firms. However, CSR did not significantly link with 
the UK firm's size. By conducting a quantitative primary research study, Limones (2020) 
realized that in the UK manufacturing sector, CSR positively influenced the financial 
performance of these firms. 
Secondly, several scholars found that CSR negatively influenced the performance of the 
UK firms measured by either market indicators or accounting indicators. For example, Moore 
(2001) found that in the supermarket industry in the UK, CSR, measured by CSR index 
constructed based on a list of raw social performance indicators, negatively influence the 
financial performance of supermarket firms (turnover growth, profitability, return on capital 
employed, growth in EPS). Brammer et al. (2006) found the negative impacts of CSR 
composite score on UK-listed firms' stock returns. 
Thirdly, the insignificant and inconsistent relationships between CSR and a firm's 
performance have also been documented in the UK literature (Samy et al., 2010). This type of 
relationship can be justified by both advantages and disadvantages of CSR activities. While 
CSR enables firms to strengthen relationships with their stakeholders, it also requires 
significant investment costs. As a result, when such costs cannot be well offset by CSR 
benefits, CSR seems to influence firms' performance insignificantly. 
 
2.5. Implications & hypothesis development 
Despite a significant number of research studies in the UK investigating the impacts of 
CSR on a firm's performance, CSR's effects on agency costs have not been well addressed. 
Agency costs refer to costs incurred by shareholders when agents behave opportunistically 
(Ang et al., 2000). In the literature, agency costs are measured by (1) asset turnover (Ang et 
al., 2000; McKnight & Weir, 2009; Florackis, 2008), (2) operating expenses (Ang et al., 2000), 
(3) selling and general administrative expenses (Florackis, 2008). Asset turnover refers to the 
efficiency of firms in utilising assets to generate revenue. When asset turnover is high, the 
efficiency in generating revenue from the assets of firms is high, meaning the low level of 
agency costs and vice versa (Ang et al., 2000). However, asset turnover is also influenced by 
industry-specific factors. For example, the asset turnover ratio of the healthcare industry is 
generally lower than that of the retail industry. Operating costs are proxied by the ratio between 
operating expenses and revenue (Ang et al., 2000). This measure is used to gauge agency costs 
since the high level of operating expenses reflects the inefficiency of managers in controlling 
operating expenditures. In other words, when managers are inefficient in operating expense 
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management, it means the management may underperform, assuming that the management is 
qualified for their work or no adverse selection takes place. However, according to Florackis 
(2008), operating costs do not reflect agency costs well since operating expenses comprise 
other costs that do not relate to the management's behaviours (i.e., impairment of intangible 
assets). The selling and general administrative expenses are measured by these expenses scaled 
by revenue. This indicator is commonly agreed as a good measure of agency costs since this 
ratio reflects the management efficiency in controlling selling and general administrative 
expenses that is controllable by the management (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009) (Chen & Yur-
Austin, 2007). When this ratio is high, the agency cost level is high since the management 
might claim more resources than needed (Florackis, 2008). 
Agency costs and a firm’s performance have some similarities and differences. In terms of 
similarities, agency costs can be used as a proxy of firms' performance (McKnight & Weir, 
2009). When agency costs are low, the firm's performance will be improved since the 
management minimises their opportunistic behaviours. Differently, when agency costs are 
high, firms' performance will be reduced since the management tends to maximise their 
opportunistic behaviours (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
In terms of differences, agency costs differ from a firm's performance since agency costs 
reflect the consequences of agency dilemmas (Jensen, 1986). However, a firm's performance 
does not only reflect the consequences of agency dilemma, but it also captures other factors 
(i.e., competencies of firms' human resources, leadership effectiveness, favourable market 
conditions) (Dawar, 2014). 
Considering the similarities and differences between agency costs and a firm's 
performance, the study on impacts of CSR on agency costs is critical to clarify whether CSR 
contributes to reducing agency conflicts between owners and managers that have not been well 
examined in the UK literature. 
To examine CSR's impacts on the UK listed retailers' agency costs, this study applies the 
integrative theories of its theoretical framework. According to the integrative theories, firms 
implement CSR to integrate social demands into their business strategy to enhance the 
relationships with stakeholders (Freeman et al., 2010). In the 2018 Corporate Governance Code 
in the UK, the stakeholder theory has also been incorporated since firms are required to ensure 
the mutual benefits of all stakeholders instead of just shareholders (FRC, 2018). Therefore, 
when the management has to discharge their accountability to different stakeholders through 
CSR activities implementation, the management's behaviours will be monitored by 
stakeholders instead of just shareholders. As a result, the management's performance can be 
improved as the monitoring activities are strengthened. CSR, hence, reduces agency costs 
incurred by the UK firms in general as well as retailing firms. 
 
H1. CSR increases asset turnover of UK retailing firms. 
H2. CSR reduces selling and general administrative expenses incurred by the UK retailing 
firms. 
According to Ebiringa et al. (2013) and Hasan (2020), CSR disclosure depends on firm 
size, whereas agency costs are also influenced by firm size (Singh & Davidson III, 2003). Large 
firms tend to experience lower agency costs than small firms since they are controlled more 
strictly by a large spectrum of stakeholders than small firms. Therefore, in this study, firm size 
is hypothesised to moderate the CSR-agency cost relationship. 
H3. Firm size moderates the CSR-agency cost relationship of the UK listed retailers 
 
3 Methodology 
Since this study examines the impacts of CSR on the UK listed retailers' agency costs in 
the past five years (2016-2020), its dependent variables are agency costs, whereas its 
7 
 
independent variables are CSR scores. Furthermore, there are also control variables that refer 
to factors that may affect agency costs. Hence, such factors are controlled throughout the 
research models. 
To measure agency costs, this study uses two proxies – asset turnover (RTA) and the 
selling and general administrative expense ratio (SGAE) as adopted by Florackis (2008). 
Therefore, RTA and SGAE are two dependent variables used in this study (hypotheses 1 and 
2 mentioned in section 2.5). RTA, measured by the ratio between revenue and total assets, 
presents the efficiency of the UK retailers in using their assets to generate revenue (Sinha, 
2012). It, hence, is an inverse measure of agency costs. Thus, the low asset turnover ratio means 
the low efficiency of retailers in generating revenue from their total assets, implying the high 
agency costs. The high asset turnover ratio means the high efficiency of retailers in generating 
revenue from their total assets, implying the low agency costs (Williams & Dobelman, 2017). 
SGAE as a fraction of revenue is used as a direct proxy of agency costs as proposed by 
Florackis (2008). This ratio is better than the operating expense ratio since it only contains 
expenses associated with the managerial consumption of firms’ resources whereas operating 
expense ratio may contain expenses that do not relate to managerial use of firms’ resources 
(i.e., impairment of intangible assets) (Williams & Dobelman, 2017). 
In terms of CSR as an independent variable, this study measures CSR performance by CSR 
scores collected from the CSRHub database (https://www.csrhub.com). The highest CSR score 
is 100, meaning the excellent CSR performance is estimated based on different criteria – 
environmental performance, social performance (community, employee, and governance). 
CSRHub database is chosen, following scholars such as Conway (2019) and Lin et al. (2019). 
 On the other hand, this study controls several variables that may be determinants of agency 
costs. 
According to the agency theory, the conflicts of interests between principals and agents 
lead to agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, to mitigate agency costs, the 
effective corporate governance mechanisms should be developed (Florackis, 2008). 
Furthermore, the involvement of the external debts as the external monitoring mechanisms 
(capital structure) is also essential to minimise agency costs (Imelda & Patricia, 2019). In this 
study, corporate governance, focusing on characteristics of the UK listed retailers' corporate 
boards and capital structure (gearing ratio) are controlled to evaluate CSR's effects on these 
firms' agency costs. Additionally, firm size proxied by the log value of total assets is also 
controlled since agency costs may be affected by the firm's size (Singh & Davidson III, 2003). 
 
The research models, hence, are developed as followings: 
 
RTA/SGAE = α + β1CSR + β2BSI + β3BIN + β4BGD + β5Capital structure + β6firm size 
+ ε 
 
Where RTN is measured by revenue divided by the total asset of a retailer, SGAE is 
calculated by selling, general administrative expenses divided by total revenue (Florackis, 
2008). CSR is measured by CSR scores collected from the CSRHub database as mentioned. 
Board size (BSI) is measured by the log value of the number of directors in the boardroom of 
the UK-listed retailers. Board independence (BIN) is the ratio between the number of non-
executive directors and a total number of directors of the UK listed retailers' boardroom. Board 
gender diversity (BGD) is the ratio between the number of female directors and a total number 
of directors in the UK listed retailers' boardroom. Capital structure is measured by the gearing 
ratio – non-current liabilities divided by capital employed (Imelda & Patricia, 2019). Firm size 
is measured by the log transformation of the UK retailers’ total assets (Florackis, 2008). 
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Additionally, this study also tests for the firm size's moderating effects for the CSR - 
agency cost relationship since CSR performance may vary with the variation of firm size 
(Ebiringa et al., 2013), and agency costs may also be affected by firm size (Singh & Davidson 
III, 2003). To test these moderating effects, the interaction term between CSR and firm size is 
added in the research model as following: 
 
RTA/SGAE = α + β1CSR + β2BSI + β3BIN + β4BGD + β5Capital structure + β6firm size 
+ β7Interaction term +ε 
 
Table 3.1. Variables of the study 
Variable  Formula  
Dependent variables  




SGAE = Selling, general administrative expenses/Total 
revenues  
Independent variable 
CSR CSR scores ranged from 0 to 100  
Control variables 
Board size (BSI) BSI = log(number of directors in the boardroom)  
Board independence (BIN)  BIN = Number of non-executive directors/Total number 
of directors in the boardroom  
Board gender diversity 
(BGD) 
BGI = Number of female directors/Total numbers of 
directors in the boardroom  
Capital structure  Gearing ratio = non-current liabilities/Capital employed  
Firm size  Firm size = log(total assets) 
Interaction term  Interaction term = CSR score * firm size (log) 
 
3.3. Sample selection 
This study examines the impacts of CSR on agency costs of the UK-listed retailers. 
Therefore, its samples must be from the UK-listed retailers. To select samples among the UK 
listed retailers, this study applies the random sampling method (Saunders et al., 2019) because 
this method gives an equal chance for all listed retailers in the UK to be included in the list of 
samples. Thus, this method can minimise sampling bias. The number of companies selected 
for this study is 45 retailers (groceries, supermarkets, internet retail.). These retailers will be 
studied in a five-year period (2016-2020), total firm-year observations of this study are 225. 
This study focuses on the five-year period (2016-2020) in the UK due to a number of 
reasons. Firstly, in 2016, the UK voted for leaving the UK (Brexit vote) (Asthana et al., 2016). 
This event resulted in the significant macroeconomic uncertainty in the UK (Amadeo, 2019). 
The relationship between the UK and EU after the Brexit was vague, leading to risk facing the 
UK firms. After the official departure from the EU, the UK firms need to secure new business 
licences, spend more resources for logistics and transportations when operating in the EU. They 
may have to incur higher labour costs due to the restriction of free movement of labour from 
the UK to the EU and vice versa. Furthermore, the large swing of the foreign exchange rates 
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following this event is also a critical issue for multinational firms in the UK (Belsie, 2019). In 
2020, the UK firms had to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic that required unpredicted costs 
(Hasan & Ahmed, 2021). Therefore, this study aims to examine whether the engagement in 
CSR is helpful for the UK listed retailers to deal with the tough macroeconomic conditions 
through the mitigation of agency costs, leading to the improvement of performance. 
Specifically, CSR can strengthen the relationship between firms and their stakeholders and 
improve their competitiveness regarding the integrative theories of CSR. 
 
3.4. Data collection 
In this study, the secondary quantitative data associated with financial figures of the UK 
listed retailers such as revenue, selling, and general administrative expenses, total assets and 
total equity is gathered from the FAME database from 2016 to 2020. The secondary data 
associated with CSR scores of the UK-listed retailers is collected from CSRHub, which is a 
good database of CSR performance of firms worldwide. This database has been used by several 
scholars, such as Conway (2019) and Lin et al. (2019). The secondary data associated with 
corporate governance of the UK listed retailers such as number of directors in the board of 
directors, number of non-executive directors, number of female directors, is gathered from 
these firms' annual reports because this data is not provided sufficiently in different years in 
FAME database. FAME only reports data associated with the board of directors in the latest 
year, whereas this study involves a time horizon of five years (2016-2020). Therefore, annual 
reports are reliable and useful sources of corporate governance data. 
 
4 Empirical analyses 
4.1. Descriptive analysis 
In table 4.1, key statistics of dependent, independent, and control variables of the study in 
the period of 2016-2020. 
In terms of dependent variables, the average asset turnover ratio (RTA) of the UK listed 
retailers is 1.758, meaning that for each pound asset, the UK listed retailers can generate 1.758-
pound revenues. The standard deviation of this dependent variable is 1.035, so the difference 
in asset turnover ratio among samples is relatively high. The average selling, general 
administrative expense (SGAE) as a per cent of the revenue of the UK listed retailers is 0.309, 
meaning that such expenses are accounted for approximately 30.9% of their revenue. The 
standard deviation of this expense is 0.162, meaning the moderate level of volatility of this 
variable. Most of the UK-listed retailers have this expense accounted from 14% to 47% of their 
revenue. 
In terms of independent variable, the average CSR score of the UK listed retailers is 0.534, 
meaning the moderate level of CSR performance achieved by these firms. However, the 
standard deviation of CSR scores is 0.317, meaning that most of the UK listed firms have CSR 
scores distributed from 0.21 to 0.85, meaning a significant dispersion in this score among 
samples. Therefore, the UK-listed retailers are very different from each other in terms of CSR 
performance. 
In terms of control variables, the average size of the UK listed retailers' boards is 8.316, 
meaning there are approximately eight directors in these firms' boards of directors. The 
standard deviation is 2.302, so the boards of these firms moderately vary in terms of size. The 
average degree of independence of these firms' boards is 0.623, meaning that non-executive 
directors of the UK listed retailers are accounted for approximately 62.3% of the board size. 
This variable has a small standard deviation (0.123), so the variation in terms of the 
independence of the boards of these firms is relatively small. The average proportion of female 
directors in the boards of the UK-listed retailers is 0.245, so female directors are accounted for 
approximately 24.5% of the board size. The standard deviation of this control variable is 0.14, 
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so the difference in the proportion of female directors among the UK-listed retailers is 
moderate. 
The average gearing ratio of these firms is 0.369, so non-current liabilities are accounted 
for approximately 36.9% of these firms' total capital employed. In other words, the UK-listed 
retailers adopted a low level of financial gearing. The standard deviation of the gearing ratio is 
0.242, so most of the UK listed retailers have a gearing ratio ranged from 0 to 48% or a 
relatively high dispersion of this variable presented. 
In terms of firm size, since the standard deviation is high (£122,727.2 million), the samples 
are extremely different in terms of the firm's size. The median firm size is £1,178.9 million, 
meaning that half of the samples have total assets less than £1,178.9 million, whereas the 
remaining have total assets higher than £1,178.9 million. 
 
 
Table 4.1. Statistical profiles of samples of the UK listed retailers (2016-2020) 
Source: the dissertation’s author 




 Mean 1.758 0.309 0.534 8.316 0.623 0.245 0.369 30,537.020 
 Median 1.534 0.308 0.660 8.000 0.636 0.250 0.393 1,178.900 
 Maximum 7.162 0.843 0.980 16.000 0.917 0.545 0.944 948,689.300 
 Minimum 0.308 0.015 0.000 4.000 0.333 0.000 -0.266 10.743 
 Std. Dev. 1.035 0.162 0.317 2.302 0.123 0.140 0.242 122,727.200 
 Skewness 2.724 0.117 -0.518 0.846 -0.400 -0.187 -0.208 5.975 
 Kurtosis 14.077 2.723 1.946 3.524 2.812 2.321 2.558 41.075 
Jarque-Bera 
1,428.6
1 1.24 20.48 29.45 6.34 5.64 3.45 14,930.02 
 Probability 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.18 0.00 
 
 
4.3. Correlation analysis 
In table 4.2, the outcomes of the correlation analysis are presented. Among the pair of 
variables, the correlation between BGD and CSR is 0.48, the correlation between firm size and 
BIN is 0.43, the correlation between firm size and capital structure is 0.42. The remaining 
variables have low correlation degrees. Hence, all pairs of variables have correlation 
coefficients less than 0.5, meaning the modest degree of correlations between them. As a result, 
the dataset is good with the low likelihood of multicollinearity in regressions with these 
variables. 
Table 4.2. Correlation matrix 
Source: the dissertation’s author 
 RTA SAGE CSR BSI BIN  BGD  
Capital 
structure  
Firm size  
RTA 




-0.27*** 1.00       
CSR 




* 1.00     
BIN 
-0.15** -0.05* 0.13** 
0.37**






* 0.01 1.00   
Capital 




* -0.28*** 1.00  







* -0.12** 0.42*** 1.00 
*** 0.01 level of significance. 
** 0.05 level of significance 
* 0.1 level of significance 
 
4.4. Regression analysis 
4.4.1. Regression outcomes 
This study firstly conducts the regressions with fixed and random effects and Hausman 
tests to determine the most suitable regression models for the study. 
The Hausman tests show that in the regression between asset turnover (RTA) and CSR, 
the fixed effects are more appropriate than the random effects. Similarly, in the regression 
between SGAE and CSR, the fixed effects are also more appropriate than the random effects 
(table 4.3). The significant chi-square statistics of the Hausman tests rejected the null 
hypothesis on the appropriateness of the random effects and confirmed the alternative 
hypothesis on the suitability of the fixed effects. 
Table 4.3. Hausman test for the fixed and random effects of the regression between 
RTA/SGAE & CSR scores 
Source: the dissertation’s author 
 RTA SGAE 
Chi-square statistics  16.3** 15.42** 
** significance at 0.05 level 
 
The heteroscedasticity tests (table 4.4) suggest that the robust standard error type should 
be applied to ensure the robust estimations in the context of the heteroscedasticity. Therefore, 
a robust standard error type is applied for both regressions, using fixed effects. 
 
Table 4.4. Heteroscedasticity tests 
Source: the dissertation’s author 
 RTA SGAE 
Chi-square statistics  90735.95*** 310000*** 




In table 4.5, outcomes of regressions with fixed effects and robust standard error type 
between RTA/SGAE and CSR, controlled for corporate governance, capital structure, and firm 
size, are provided. 
In the regression with fixed effects, robust standard error type between asset turnover and 
CSR and control variables, the CSR's coefficient is significant and negative. Therefore, CSR 
significantly reduced the asset turnover of the UK-listed retailers in this period. If CSR score 
increases by one unit, RTA will reduce 0.198 units when others are fixed. Hence, this negative 
effect is marginal. 
For the UK retailers with the CSR scores controlled, their asset turnover ratio is 
significantly influenced by board size, capital structure, and firm size. Since coefficients of 
these variables are negative, they inversely affected asset turnover ratios of the UK listed 
retailers with the strongest effects of capital structure and moderate effects of board size and 
firm size. If board size increases by 1%, the asset turnover ratio will reduce by 0.277 units 
when others are constant. If the gearing ratio increases by one unit, the asset turnover ratio will 
reduce by 0.8496 units when others are constant. If firm size increases by 1%, asset turnover 
will reduce by 0.431 units when others are constant. 
In the regression with the fixed effects, robust standard error type for SGAE and CSR, 
controlled by determining variables, the coefficient of CSR is insignificant. Therefore, CSR 
insignificantly affected the SGAE of the UK-listed firms. 
For the UK listed retailers with CSR control, their SGAE is significantly affected by board 
size at a 90% confidence level. If board size increases by 1%, SGAE will reduce by 0.046 units 
when others are constant. Thus, such negative effects of board size on SGAE are modest. 
Remaining variables such as board independence, board gender diversity, capital structure, and 
firm size insignificantly influence the SGAE of the UK samples. 
 
Table 4.5. Regression outcomes 
Source: the dissertation’s author 
 RTA SAGE 
Constant  5.9029*** 0.2514* 
CSR -0.198** -0.0458 
Board size  -0.2277** -0.0465* 
Board independence  0.1519 -0.0175 
Board gender diversity  -.1105 -0.0794 
Capital structure  -0.8496*** 0.0367 
Firm size  -0.4309** 0.0262 
R-squared 0.2031 0.1748 
Observation  225 225 
*** 0.01 level of significance 
** 0.05 level of significance 
* 0.1 level of significance 
4.4.2. Robustness tests 
Since fixed effects with the robust standard error type are applied, regressions are robust 
to heteroscedasticity. The normality of residuals/errors are tested to confirm R of the 
regressions. The outcomes show that errors are normally distributed, so the consistency of the 





Table 4.6. Normality of residuals of regression models 
Source: the dissertation’s author 
 RTA SAGE 
Jarque-Bera  2.89 2.12 
4.5. Moderating effects of firm size 
 
To test the firm size’s moderating effects for the relationship between agency costs and 
CSR, the interaction term between CSR and firm size is added in regression models. In table 
4.7, outcomes of the regressions with interaction terms are presented. 
In both regression models, the coefficients of the interaction term are insignificant. 
Therefore, firm size does not moderate the CSR - agency costs relationship, controlled by 
corporate governance and capital structure. 
 
Table 4.7. Tests for firm size’s moderating effects 
Source: the dissertation’s author 
 RTA SAGE 
Constant  6.184*** .1368 
CSR -.8419** .2166 
Board size  -.2761 -0.047* 
Board independence  .1437 -.0142 
Board gender diversity  -.0999 -.0837 
Capital structure  -.8626*** .042 
Firm size  -.4619* .0388 
Interaction term  .0724 -.0295 
R-squared 0.2076 0.0797 
Observation  225 225 
*** 0.01 level of significance 
** 0.05 level of significance 
* 0.1 level of significance 
 
4.6. Discussions 
4.6.1. The CSR performance of the UK listed retailers (2016-2020) 
In the period of 2016-2020, the UK-listed retailers have the moderate CSR performance 
with the average score of 0.534. However, because of the high standard deviation, this industry 
has experienced a high dispersion in CSR performance among the UK-listed retailers. This 
means that besides good CSR performers in this industry, there are bad CSR performers. For 
example, there are 10 UK listed retailers have CSR scores higher than 80/100 (i.e., Next Plc, 
Unilever, WH Smith, Travis Perkins, Sainsbury) 14 retailers have CSR scores from 60/100 to 
79/100 (i.e., PZ Cussons, Dixons Carphone, Halfords Group). Remaining (18 retailers have 
CSR scores lower than 50/100 (i.e., BooHoo Group, Ocado Group, Fraser Group), and three 
retailers have CSR scores from 50 to 59/100 (i.e., Pendragon, Card Factory, JD Sports). 
Therefore, the UK-listed retailers need to invest more in CSR in order to improve their CSR 
performance, especially since the retail industry uses significant human resources that relate to 
several CSR issues such as human rights, employee wellbeing, working conditions, health, 
safety and modern slavery. The investment in CSR activities also enables the UK-listed 
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retailers to comply with the 2018 Corporate Governance Code and to satisfy the public 
demands on CSR. 
The average CSR performance of the UK-listed retailers may be explicated by the fact that 
this industry does not create significant environmental footprints like textile, oil, and gas 
industries (Hasan, 2020). Therefore, they are not motivated to engage in CSR, especially 
environmental activities in order to legitimate themselves and to deal with the industrial 
pressure and regulations. The low investment in environmental initiatives of the UK retailers 
contributes to their low overall CSR scores. 
 
4.6.2. Impacts of CSR on agency costs 
This study has investigated that CSR significantly reduced asset turnover ratios of the UK-
listed retailers in the period of 2016-2020. Therefore, H1 is rejected. The significant negative 
effects of CSR on asset turnover of the UK listed retailers are aligned with findings of Moore 
(2001) and Brammer et al. (2006) since they revealed that CSR negatively influenced the UK 
listed firms' performance, including that of supermarkets (Moore, 2001). 
However, this study has explored that CSR insignificantly affected the selling and general 
administrative expenses of the UK-listed retailers. With this finding, H2 is also rejected. 
Findings associated with H1 and H2 present some discrepancies. However, such discrepancies 
are explainable. 
Firstly, the asset turnover ratio measures the efficiency of the management in generating 
revenue from assets (Florackis, 2008). Thus, the high asset turnover means low agency costs, 
and the low asset turnover means high agency costs. Hence, the asset turnover ratio is an 
indirect proxy of agency costs as the low ratio may reflect the inefficient investment decisions, 
the significant perquisite consumption, the insufficient managerial efforts, and the purchase of 
unproductive products. However, the efficiency of the management in generating revenue from 
assets is also influenced by the qualifications and abilities of the management instead of just 
agency conflicts (Ang et al., 2000). Differently, selling and general administrative expenses 
refer to all expenses associated with everyday operating expenses for running a business, 
including rent, salaries, advertising, and marketing costs  (Florackis, 2008). Therefore, the 
selling and general administrative expenses ratio is a direct proxy of agency costs as it shows 
the degree of discretion of the management in using a company's resources. However, this 
proxy does not show different types of agency costs incurred by a company that is out of the 
scope of selling and general administrative expenses (i.e., poor investment decisions). 
Therefore, this ratio covers a narrower range of agency costs than asset turnover. Because of 
the difference in the two proxies of agency costs, the impacts of CSR on agency costs vary 
across their measures. 
From the negative impacts of CSR on asset turnover as an indirect proxy of agency costs 
found in this study, we suggest that the investment in CSR can be a means for the management 
to claim more resources than needed and/or to make poor investment decisions, making the 
agency costs increase, assuming that the management is qualified to conduct their tasks (no 
adverse selection). Since the current accounting systems are not sufficient to account for CSR 
activities, CSR costs are not treated properly, leading to opportunities for the management of 
the UK listed retailers to claim more resources than needed through other broader activities 
than managerial activities measured by SGAE. Therefore, it is critical for the development of 
CSR accounting to recognise CSR costs properly and to evaluate the effectiveness of CSR 
performance (i.e., the return on investment in CSR activities). As a result, CSR cannot be 
treated as a means for the management to claim more resources, leading to the higher agency 




4.6.3. The moderating role of firm size 
This study does not find any firm size's moderating effects for the relationship between 
CSR and agency costs. This means that this relationship does not vary across the size of the 
UK-listed retailers. Hence, H3 is rejected. This finding is a significant contribution of the study 
to the UK literature as it shows that impacts of CSR on agency costs of the UK listed retailers 
are consistently disregarding their firm size. 
5 Conclusions & implications 
5.1. Conclusions 
This study aims to investigate the impacts of CSR on the UK listed retailers' agency costs 
in the period of 2016-2020. In a form of an empirical design, using regression analysis with 
fixed effects and robust standard error type for panel data, this study has obtained its research 
aims and objectives. 
Firstly, through the descriptive analysis, this study has revealed that in the 2016-2020 
period, the UK-listed retailers have moderate CSR performance on average. However, there is 
a large dispersion in CSR performance among retailers. The moderate CSR performance of 
these firms is justified by the industry-specific characteristics. The UK retailers do not create 
significant environmental footprints due to their nature, so they are not pressured to 
significantly invest in environmental activities regarding the institutional and legitimacy 
theories. As a result, their CSR average score is moderate. 
Secondly, through the regression analysis with fixed effects and robust standard error type 
applied for panel data, this study has investigated that in the studied period, CSR significantly 
reduced asset turnover of the UK listed retailers with the modest effects, but it insignificantly 
influences selling and general administrative expenses of this industry. Therefore, CSR 
increases agency costs when a broader measure (RTA) is used and insignificantly influenced 
agency costs when a narrower measure (SGAE) is applied. These findings imply that the 
management of the UK-listed retailers tended to engage in broader activities such as the poor 
investment decisions associated with CSR rather than to consume more selling and general 
administrative resources when their firms invest in CSR activities. Therefore, CSR might serve 
as a means for the UK-listed retailers' management to maximise their benefits from the 
inefficient assets' utilisation. 
Thirdly, this study does not find firm size’s moderating effects for the relationship between 
CSR and agency costs in the studied period, meaning that these relationships are consistent 
across sizes of the UK listed retailers. 
For the UK listed retailers with CSR controlled, their asset turnover is negatively affected 
by board size, capital structure, and firm size, whereas their selling and general administrative 
expenses ratio is only negatively affected by board size. Therefore, the reduction of board size 
and external debts is proposed to mitigate agency conflicts. Large firms need to enhance their 
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